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REFINING STATUTORY INTERPRETATION:  
HOW NATURAL GAS EXPORT REGULATIONS 
VIOLATE U.S. INTERNATIONAL TRADE 
OBLIGATIONS 
Amanda L. Tharpe+ 
Four decades ago the Middle East cut off oil shipments to the United States in 
retaliation for U.S. military support of Israel.1  The resulting Arab Oil Embargo 
taught the United States a hard lesson.2  It crippled the U.S. economy and sent 
fuel prices skyrocketing, while bringing to the forefront our nation’s dangerous 
and fragile dependence on Middle Eastern oil, which powers the U.S. economy.3 
Today, Washington, D.C. is locked in an exhaustive debate over how to 
manage a domestic oil and natural gas boom responsible for the creation of over 
a million American jobs.4  For the first time in history, the United States is 
inching its way towards energy independence.5  Advances in energy technology 
led by the combination of horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing have 
catapulted the United States into a position of global leadership as a top 
international energy producer. 6   Thanks to the enormous increase in 
unconventional oil and natural gas production, the United States has recently 
overtaken both Saudi Arabia and Russia as the world’s largest oil producer.7  
The International Energy Agency predicts that by 2020 the United States could 
become a net exporter of natural gas.8 
Standing as an obstacle to this progress are outdated and contrasting laws that 
prohibit the United States from exporting domestically produced natural gas 
                                                 
 + J.D., summa cum laude, 2016, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law; 
B.A., 2004, Grove City College.  The author would like to thank Salo Zelermyer of Bracewell LLP 
for his invaluable expertise and feedback throughout the writing process.   
 1.  Daniel Yergin, Congratulations, America. You’re (Almost) Energy Independent, 
POLITICO (Nov. 2013), http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2013/11/congratulations-amer 
ica-youre-almost-energy-independent-now-what-098985. 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Angel Gonzelez, Making Sense of the U.S. Oil Boom, WALL ST. JOURNAL, Sept. 17, 2012, 
at R3. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Latest Analysis: U.S. Overtakes Saudi Arabia and Russia as Largest Oil Producer, INST. 
FOR ENERGY RESEARCH (July 10, 2014), http://instituteforenergyresearch.org/analysis/u-s-
overtakes-saudi-arabia-russia-worlds-biggest-oil-producer. 
 8. Press Release, Int’l Energy Agency, North America leads shift in global energy balance, 
IEA says in latest World Energy Outlook (Nov. 12, 2012), http://www.iea.org/newsroomand 
events/pressreleases/2012/november/name,33015,en.html. 
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while freely permitting the export of domestically produced crude oil.9  The laws 
regulating natural gas exports are decades old and reflective of political and 
international circumstances that are largely outdated in light of today’s ever 
changing global energy market.10 
As a result, the United States is prevented from taking full advantage of this 
economic opportunity that could create millions of U.S. jobs and historically 
shift the global balance of power in the international energy market.11  Critically, 
these current policies also likely violate the United States’ international trade 
obligations as a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO).12  For these 
reasons, many are calling for the United States to revise these outdated policies 
to better reflect the reality of domestic energy production in America today.13 
In the current regulatory regime, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and 
the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) regulate exports of natural 
gas under the Natural Gas Act of 1938. 14   Until recently, crude oil was 
historically regulated by the U.S. Department of Commerce (DOC) through the 
Energy Policy and Conservation Act (“EPCA”) and the Export Administration 
                                                 
 9. See generally infra notes 14–17 and accompanying text. 
 10. See Natural Gas Act of 1938, ch. 556, 52 Stat. 812 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 
717(a)-717(z) (2006)); Energy Policy and Conservation Act, Pub. L. No. 94-163, 89 Stat. 871 
(1975) (codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S. Code). 
 11. Jim Efstathiou Jr., Fracking will Support 1.7 Million Jobs, Study Shows, BLOOMBERG 
(Oct. 23, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2012-10-23/fracking-will-support-1-7-
million-jobs-study-shows; Frank Verrastro & Guy Caruso, The Arab Oil Embargo—40 Years 
Later, CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT’L STUDS. (Oct 16, 2013), http://csis.org/publication/arab-oil-
embargo-40-years-later. 
 12. See infra Section II.A–B. 
 13. Steven Rattner, Let Our Oil and Gas Go: America Should Rescind the Ban on Crude–Oil 
Exports, N.Y. TIMES (July 23, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/24/opinion/america-
should-rescind-the-ban-on-crude-oil-exports.html?_r=0 (highlighting the fact that much of the 
lightweight oil now being produced from major shale formations in the United States cannot be 
refined by U.S. refineries that were built to process heavy imported crude); see Andrew Restuccia, 
Bid to end oil export ban runs into pump politics, POLITICO (Jan. 12, 2015), http://www. 
politico.com/story/2015/01/bid-to-end-oil-export-ban-runs-into-pump-politics-114192.html 
(federal legislators are debating the idea of changing these policies). 
 14. Natural Gas Act of 1938, ch. 556, 52 Stat. 812 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 717(b) 
(2006)); Natural Gas Regulation, U.S. DEPT. OF ENERGY, http://energy.gov/fe/services/natural-
gas-regulation (last visited Aug. 1, 2016).  Companies can apply for two types of export permits.  
A blanket authorization permits a company to export natural gas for no more than two years.  A 
long-term authorization enables a company to export natural gas for longer than two years.  See 
JAMES BACCHUS & ROSA JEONG, GREENBERG TRAURIG LLP, LNG AND COAL: UNREASONABLE 
DELAYS IN APPROVING EXPORTS LIKELY VIOLATE INTERNATIONAL TREATY OBLIGATIONS 5 
(2013), http://www.nam.org/Issues/Energy/LNG-and-Coal-Report-NOV-2013/LNG-COAL-Rep 
ort.pdf (noting that the DOE issues a license allowing the company to export a certain amount of 
natural gas, while the siting, construction, and operation of LNG export facilities is regulated and 
permitted by FERC). 
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Act of 1979 (“EAA”).15  Under these laws, the export of both commodities 
required approval of a permit, which allowed the Executive Branch to prohibit 
the export of both products by either denying or delaying the approval of the 
permit.16  However, in December 2015, after a lengthy debate, Congress lifted 
the prohibition on crude oil exports, allowing U.S. oil producers to freely export 
crude oil overseas.17 
This leaves an inconsistent and controversial federal process that restricts only 
natural gas exports and impacts the United States’ international commitments as 
a member of the WTO.  As a member country, the United States has agreed to 
abide by certain trade commitments when trading with other WTO member 
nations.18  By using these restrictive export policies to prohibit or delay exports 
of natural gas to other countries, the United States may be in violation of its 
international trade obligations as a member of the WTO.19   As a result of 
Congress lifting the ban on crude oil exports, these two very similar 
commodities are regulated in two different ways: one is regulated in compliance 
with the United States’ obligations as a WTO member, while regulation of the 
other likely violates these same obligations.20 
This Comment analyzes the differences in federal laws and regulations 
governing the export of crude oil and natural gas in conjunction with the United 
States’ international trade obligations as a member of the WTO.  Part I discusses 
the history of federal oil and gas export regulations, with additional analysis of 
our trade obligations as a member of the WTO.  It also analyzes WTO-approved 
exceptions to those obligations that have been given to other countries with 
restrictive trade policies.  Part II discusses and analyzes recent WTO challenges 
filed against Chinese export policies that are similar to the United States’ own 
export policies.  Part II then explains why it is unlikely that current U.S. natural 
                                                 
 15. See Energy Policy and Conservation Act, Pub. L. No. 94-163, § 103, 89 Stat. 871, 877 
(1975) (codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S. Code); Export Administration Act of 
1979, Pub. L. No. 96-72, § 10, 93 Stat. 503, 526 (codified as amended at 59 U.S.C. §§ 2401-2420). 
 16. See Energy Policy and Conservation Act § 103; Export Administration Act of 1979 § 10. 
 17. Amy Harder & Lynn Cook, Congressional Leaders Agree to Lift 40-Year Ban on Oil 
Exports, WALL ST. JOURNAL (Dec. 16, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/congressional-leaders-
agree-to-lift-40-year-ban-on-oil-exports-1450242995. 
 18. See Understanding the WTO: What is the world trade organization?, WORLD TRADE 
ORG.,  https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact1_e.htm (last visited Mar. 12, 
2016) (explaining that the overarching goal of the WTO agreements is to encourage the free flow 
of trade among its member countries for economic development). 
 19. ALAN M. DUNN, BUSH CTR., U.S. EXPORT RESTRAINTS ON CRUDE OIL VIOLATE 
INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS AND ARE VULNERABLE TO CHALLENGE 4 (2013), http://www.bush 
center.org/sites/default/files/USExportRestraints_Dunn.pdf (describing export restrictions in 
international forums for crude oil, which is treated the same way as any other product under GATT, 
including natural gas in any form). 
 20. Id. at 2 (explaining that natural gas and crude oil are treated the same as any other product 
under the WTO, so the remaining ban on natural gas likely remains a violation of WTO obligations 
while the new policies on crude oil exports are more compliant with them); see also Harder & 
Cook, supra note 17, at 89–90. 
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gas export policies qualify for an exception to WTO international trade 
obligations and instead likely violate these obligations.  Part III suggests that 
U.S. executive agencies may be able to bring current U.S. laws into compliance 
with international trade obligations by interpreting existing statutes differently. 
It also suggests, alternatively, that Congressional action, similar to 
Congressional action taken to lift the ban on crude oil exports, can be a viable 
solution to this regulatory disparity. 
I.  DECADES-OLD STATUTES GREATLY RESTRICT EXPORTS OF LIQUEFIED 
NATURAL GAS WHILE CRUDE OIL IS FREELY EXPORTED TO INTERNATIONAL 
TRADING PARTNERS 
Federal regulation of oil and gas began in 1920 when the Mineral Leasing Act 
gave the federal government the authority to regulate and lease public lands for 
the development of crude oil, natural gas, and other minerals found on public 
lands.21 
A.  Natural Gas Regulations Lead to Disparate Treatment among Trading 
Partners 
Federal regulation of natural gas started in 1928 when Senator Thomas Walsh 
(D-MT) introduced a Congressional resolution to make policy recommendations 
and study the natural gas industry.22  A decade later, after a series of smaller 
regulatory bills, the Natural Gas Act of 1938 (“NGA”) was signed into law.23  
The NGA passed without opposition from the natural gas industry, which, while 
supportive of the various state regulatory schemes that were being implemented, 
believed federal regulation would further stabilize the industry and provide 
regulatory uniformity.24  In turn, legislators were reassured that the public would 
                                                 
 21. Mineral Leasing Act, Pub. L. No. 66-146, 41 Stat 437 (1920).  Prior to the Mineral 
Leasing Act, the General Mining Act of 1872 allowed citizens who discovered minerals to have 
exclusive possession of that land and the land surrounding those minerals.  General Mining Act of 
1872, 30 U.S.C. § 26 (2006).  This policy presented a problem for oil prospectors who used their 
own resources to drill for and discover oil, but had no legal recourse or security against speculators.  
SAMUEL HAYES, CONSERVATION AND THE GOSPEL OF EFFICIENCY: THE PROGRESSIVE 
CONSERVATION MOVEMENT, 1890-1920 89 (1959). 
 22. ROBERT L. BRADLEY, JR., OIL, GAS AND GOVERNMENT: THE U.S. EXPERIENCE 861 
(1996) (focusing specifically on the market and economics of the natural gas industry). 
 23. Id. at 862, 871 (noting that the precursors for the Natural Gas Act were the Public Utility 
Holding Company Act and the Federal Power Act, both of which sought to regulate energy 
companies and the rates they charged consumers). 
 24. Id. at 864–67.  In testimony regarding the House version of the NGA, a natural gas 
industry witness only suggested changes that would “reduce the expense and paperwork for the 
industry.” Id. at 867.  And while they felt the bill would not lead to a lower rate for consumers as 
the increased costs would likely be passed on to them, the industry generally did not oppose federal 
regulation.  See id. 
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not become victims of increased rates nor be subjected to the nuisance of 
constant pipeline construction in cities and towns.25 
The NGA still regulates natural gas today and requires that no person or 
company may export natural gas from the United States without submitting an 
application and receiving approval from the Federal Power Commission (the 
“Commission” or “FPC”) to export the natural gas they produce.26  Under the 
NGA, the approval is to be issued unless the Commission finds the proposed 
export of the natural gas is not “consistent with the public interest.”27 
In 1938, the Commission regulated the hydroelectric, electric, and natural gas 
industries. 28   That same year, the Department of Energy Organization Act 
transferred all of the Commission’s responsibilities to the DOE.29  Today, the 
Office of Fossil Energy within the DOE is responsible for approving or denying 
natural gas export applications based on “public interest” determinations. 30  
Because the term “public interest” is not statutorily defined, the DOE has broad 
flexibility in deciding whether natural gas exports are “consistent with the public 
interest.”  Over time, there has been considerable confusion and disagreement 
over what factors should be evaluated when making this determination.31 
The process for exporting liquefied natural gas (“LNG”) was further clarified 
by the Energy Policy Act of 1992, which allows expeditious approval for permits 
to export to countries with which the United States has a free trade agreement 
(“FTA”).32  Export requests to these countries are deemed “consistent with the 
                                                 
 25. See id. at 855–56 (explaining that while the traditional view is that it is the public who 
pushes for government regulation of enterprises, in this case, it was actually the energy industry 
that convinced the public of the need for regulation). 
 26. Natural Gas Act of 1938, 15 U.S.C. § 717b(a) (2012). 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. § 717a(9); History of FERC, FED. ENERGY REGULATORY COMM’N, http://www.ferc. 
gov/students/ferc/history.asp (last visited Mar. 12, 2016). 
 29. Department of Energy Organization Act, Pub. L. No. 95-91, 91 Stat. 565, 577–78 (1977) 
(codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7101–7352 (2012)). 
 30. Administrative Procedures with Respect to the Import and Export of Natural Gas, 10 
C.F.R. §§ 590.101, 590.102(a) (1998). 
 31. Jeremy Brown, An Inconsistent Approach to “Public Interest” Consistency 
Determinations: Section 3 of the Natural Gas Act and the Rush to Export LNG, KAY BAILEY 
HUTCHINSON CTR. FOR ENERGY, LAW & BUS. (Sept. 26, 2014), http://www.utexas.edu/ 
law/centers/energy/blog/2014/09/an-inconsistent-approach-to-public-interest-consistency-
determinations-section-3-of-the-natural-gas-act-and-the-rush-to-export-lng/ (arguing that while the 
DOE claims they review a variety of factors such as “economic impacts, international impacts, 
security of natural gas supply, and environmental impacts” when making public interest 
determinations, these factors are more of a “grab bag” rather than a “coherent framework” for 
analysis). 
 32. Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-486, 106 Stat. 2776, 2866.  The United States 
currently has Free Trade Agreements with 20 countries.  Free Trade Agreements, OFFICE OF THE 
U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements (last 
visited Mar. 14, 2016).  “The existing regulatory framework only allowed for exports of LNG to 
countries with a Free Trade Agreement (“FTA”).  These FTA countries are mostly large producers 
of natural gas themselves (Canada, Mexico) or did not consume any relevant amounts (many 
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public interest” and are approved “without modification or delay.”33  As a result, 
public attention on the DOE approval process has largely focused on permit 
applications submitted by companies seeking to export natural gas to countries 
with which the United States does not have a free trade agreement (“non-FTA 
countries”).34  While these applications historically have not attracted much 
public attention, in the wake of the domestic natural gas renaissance, the DOE 
has more closely considered the determination as to whether or not the proposed 
export would be consistent with the public interest.35  This increased scrutiny 
has led to lengthy delays in approving exports to non-FTA countries.36 
                                                 
Central American States).” Charles K. Ebinger & Tim Boersma, To Export LNG Without 
Restriction, or Not?, BROOKINGS: UP FRONT (Apr. 2, 2014, 3:27 PM), http://www.brookings.edu/ 
blogs/up-front/posts/2014/04/02-export-lng-restriction-ebinger-boersma. 
 33. 15 U.S.C. § 717b(c) (2012). 
 34. See Salo Zelermeyer, DOE study shows net economic benefits from lng exports and kicks 
off key period for industry, LEXOLOGY (Dec. 7, 2012), http://www.lexology.com/library/ 
detail.aspx?g=141a1719-11b7-445e-9971-9a754f3913a7 (explaining that the “public interest” 
issue came to the forefront after the DOE granted its first LNG permit for exporting to a non-FTA 
country); see also Margo L. Thorning, Ph.D., Act on LNG Encourages USTR to Support LNG 
Exports, ACT ON LNG EXPORTS: BLOG (May 7, 2015), http://actonlng.org/2014/05/act-on-lng-
encourages-ustr-to-support-expedited-lng-exports/ (explaining that expediting the approval process 
for LNG export applications is necessary for the American economy). 
 35. See Natural Gas Resources: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Energy and Nat. Res., 113th 
Cong. 25 (2013) [hereinafter Hearing]; see Thorning, supra note 34 (reminding the readers that the 
USTR has only approved one LNG export permit to date and has twenty applications pending still); 
see also David L. Goldwyn, DOE’s New Procedure for Approving LNG Export Permits: A More 
Sensible Approach, BROOKINGS (June 10, 2014), http://www.brookings.edu/research/articles/20 
14/06/10-doe-approving-lng-export-goldwyn-hendrix (describing that the DOE approves projects, 
on average, every eight weeks, and that with twenty four applications pending, it will take the DOE 
four years to review them). 
 36. See Hearing, supra note 35; BACCHUS & JEONG, supra note 14, at 2–3 (discussing that 
LNG export projects can take five years from the time of DOE approval to the time the company 
begins exporting LNG.  As a result, the DOE’s delay in approving export applications can have 
serious economic consequences for both the company and the United States).  The DOE has 
received an influx of LNG export applications since 2010, yet has approved less than ten 
applications to export to non-FTA countries.  Brown, supra note 31; see Long Term Applications 
Received by DOE/FE to Export Domestically Produced LNG from the Lower-48 States, U.S. DEPT. 
OF ENERGY, http://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2014/10/f18/Summary%20of%20LNG%20Export 
%20Applications_0.pdf (last updated Oct. 21, 2014) (showing disparate timelines in approving 
export applications to FTA countries vs. non-FTA countries).  It should also be noted that the DOE 
recently finalized changes to its LNG export application approval process to non-FTA countries.  
Procedures for Liquefied Natural Gas Export Decisions, 79 Fed. Reg. 48,132 (Aug. 15, 2014).  
Under the current structure, DOE can issue conditional approval for an LNG export application 
prior to the FERC finalizing its required National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”) review for 
an LNG export facility.  Id. at 48,133.  Moving forward, however, DOE will wait until the FERC 
NEPA review is complete before issuing its own public interest determination.  Id. at 48,135.  These 
changes came in response to industry commenters’ request for regulatory certainty and to 
streamline the current LNG approval process.  However, some in the industry feel this new approval 
process could negatively impact proposed projects.  See Bobby McMahon, US DOE finalizes 
changes to LNG export review process, PLATTS (Aug. 14, 2014, 2:46 PM), http://www.platts.com/ 
latest-news/shipping/washington/us-doe-finalizes-changes-to-lng-export-review-21077079. 
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B.  Crude Oil Export Regulations Resulted in a Decades-Long Ban on Crude 
Oil Exports 
Until recently, the DOC had historically regulated the export of crude oil 
through two laws that were passed in the 1970s.37  During the Arab-Israeli War 
in 1973, the Arab nations threatened to cut off oil exports to any country 
supporting Israel’s war efforts.38  When the United States continued supplying 
Israel with material support, the Organization of Arab Petroleum and Exporting 
Countries (OPEC) cut off exports of crude oil to the United States.39 
The resulting shortage and price shock culminated in the passage of EPCA.40  
EPCA aimed to “increase the supply of fossil fuels in the United States” and 
allowed the President to “promulgate a rule prohibiting the export of crude oil 
or natural gas produced in the United States, except that the President may . . . 
exempt from such prohibition such crude oil or natural gas exports which he 
determines to be consistent with the national interest.”41 
EPCA was implemented through short supply controls enforced by the Bureau 
of Industry and Security (BIS)—a bureau of the DOC.42  Similar to natural gas, 
a company seeking to export domestically produced crude oil was required to 
submit an application for a license to export the commodity.43  The license was 
to be granted if it was found that the proposed export was consistent with the 
national interest.44  There were exceptions to the license requirement for certain 
oil exports such as those from Alaska’s Cook Inlet, exports to Canada, exports 
dealing with the management of the Strategic Petroleum Reserve, and exports 
of heavy California crude oil, among other exceptions.45 
                                                 
 37. See Energy Policy and Conservation Act, Pub. L. No. 94-163, 89 Stat. 871 (1975) 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S. Code); Export Administration Act of 1979, 
Pub. L. No. 96-72, 93 Stat. 503 (codified as amended at 59 U.S.C. §§ 2401-2420). 
 38. BRADLEY, supra note 22, at 486–87. 
 39. Id.  Following the embargo, citizens began “panic buying” which caused prices to rise by 
seventy five percent that October.  Id. at 487 n.76. 
 40. Id. at 486–93; Frank Verrastro & Guy Caruso, The Arab Oil Embargo—40 Years Later, 
CTR. FOR STRATEGIC AND INT’L STUDIES: COMMENTARY (Oct. 16, 2013), http://csis.org/ 
publication/arab-oil-embargo-40-years-later.  Prior to EPCA’s passage on December 22, 1975, the 
Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act authorized “the imposition of broad price, production, 
allocation, and marketing controls”.  Id. 
 41. Energy Policy and Conservation Act, Pub. L. No. 94-163, § 103(B)(b)(1), 89 Stat. 871, 
877 (1975) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 6212(b)(1) (2012)). 
 42. Export Administration Regulation, 15 C.F.R. § 754.2(b)(2) (2011).  Short supply controls 
allow the President to control the export of goods that are in short supply by issuing and limiting 
export licenses or implementing quantitative restrictions on the product.  PHILLIP BROWN, CONG. 
RESEARCH SERV., R43442, U.S. CRUDE EXPORT POLICY: BACKGROUND AND CONSIDERATIONS 7 
(2014). 
 43. 15 C.F.R. §754.2(b)(2). 
 44. Id. 
 45. Export Administration Regulation, 15 C.F.R. § 754.1 (2011); 15 C.F.R. §754.2 
(b)(1).  BIS will issue a license to exports falling under one of the exemptions.  Id.  Throughout the 
1980s and 1990s, the President made determinations that these exports, and crude oil transported 
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A second response to the shortage caused by the Arab Oil Embargo was the 
decision by the Federal Energy Office to include crude oil on the Commodity 
Control List, which was established by the Export Administration Act of 1969 
(EAA).46  The 1979 Amendments to the EAA tightened these export restrictions 
by conferring “upon the President the power to control exports for national 
security, foreign policy, or short-supply purposes, [and] authoriz[ing] the 
President to establish export licensing mechanisms for certain items.”47  The 
EAA of 1979 required crude oil exports be approved only if the President finds 
“such exports would not reduce the domestic supply of oil . . . and would be in 
the national interest.”48  The EAA restrictions expired in 2001 but the President 
continued to implement them through annual executive orders. 49   Congress 
ultimately took action and overturned the ban on crude oil exports in December 
2015 in an effort to increase American energy production, recognizing the 
impracticality of these restrictive laws and to give the United States a stronger 
position on the international energy stage.50 
Historically, agency interpretation of statutes and regulations are accorded 
broad deference under the standard applied in Chevron, Inc. v. Natural 
Resources Defense Council, Inc.,51  which gives strong deference to agency 
statutory interpretations so long as that interpretation is not “arbitrary, 
capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.”52  Later courts would clarify 
that this deference was not so absolute in that it allowed agencies to interpret 
statutes in a way that violated international obligations.  The court in Caterpillar, 
Inc. v. United States53 articulated this reasoning by holding that “statutes should 
                                                 
through the Trans-Alaska Pipeline, were within the national interest.  NEELESH NERURKAR, CONG. 
RESEARCH SERV., R42465, U.S. OIL IMPORTS AND EXPORTS 22 (2012). 
 46. BRADLEY, supra note 22, at 770.  The Commodity Control List is a list of products 
requiring export licenses and approval of the Department of Commerce to export the product to 
specific or all countries.  IAN F. FERGUSSON & PAUL K. KERR, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41916, 
THE U.S. EXPORT CONTROLS SYSTEM AND THE PRESIDENT’S REFORM INITIATIVE 3–4 (2014).  
The Commodity Control List is divided up into multiple categories such as electronics, computers, 
materials processing, etc., and it describes the reason for the export control of each product.  Id. 
 47. PHILLIP BROWN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43442, U.S. CRUDE EXPORT POLICY: 
BACKGROUND AND CONSIDERATIONS 7 (2014). 
 48. BRADLEY, supra note 22, at 771. 
 49. See, e.g., Continuation of the National Emergency with Respect to Export Control 
Regulations, 78 Fed. Reg. 59,107 (Aug. 13, 2013). 
 50. Billy House & Erik Wasson, Congress Passes U.S. Spending Bill to End Oil Export Ban, 
BLOOMBERG (Dec. 18, 2015), http://www.bloomberg.com/politics/articles/2015-12-18/house-
passes-u-s-spending-bill-that-ends-crude-oil-export-ban. 
 51. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
 52. Id. at 844 (“[C]onsiderable weight should be accorded to an executive department’s 
construction of a statutory scheme it is entrusted to administer . . . ”). 
 53. 941 F. Supp. 1241 (Ct. Int’l Trade 1996). 
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not be interpreted to conflict with international obligations.”54  Courts have also 
emphasized that agencies should make an effort to ensure their statutory 
interpretations allow for the United States’ compliance with international 
agreements.55 
As a result of these differing legal structures and varying agency 
interpretations, the export of these two similar resources—natural gas and crude 
oil—are regulated by multiple statutory schemes and two different agencies.56  
Crude oil can be freely exported while natural gas is still subject to multiple 
reviews and scrutiny.57  This structure lends itself to inconsistent national energy 
policies, robust criticism from industry and other stakeholders, and poses 
significant questions as to the legality of current U.S. export policies regulating 
natural gas.58 
C.  As WTO Members, the United States is Obligated to Enact 
Nondiscriminatory Trade Practices 
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was a multinational 
agreement originating in 1948, and updated in 1986, that was established to 
reduce trade barriers among nations.59  In 1994, GATT was modified by the 
WTO, which kept in place many of GATT’s key trade provisions that WTO 
                                                 
 54. Id. at 1248; see also Fed. Mogul Corp. v. United States, 63 F.3d 1572, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 
1995) (holding that statutes should be interpreted in a way that allows for compliance with 
international agreements in balancing domestic statutes with our obligations under the GATT). 
 55. See Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804) (one of the 
earliest cases involving domestic statutory interpretation in light of international obligations); see 
also Union Steel v. United States, 823 F. Supp. 2d 1346, 1358 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2012), aff’d, 713 
F.3d 1101 (Fed. Cir. 2013). 
 56. ADAM VANN, DANIEL T. SHEDD & BRANDON J. MURRILL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 
R43231, FEDERAL PERMITTING AND OVERSIGHT OF EXPORT OF FOSSIL FUELS 2 (2013). 
 57. Harder & Cook, supra note 17. See generally supra notes 14–17 and accompanying text. 
 58. Doug Palmer, US ban on LNG exports would violate WTO rules – experts, REUTERS (Jan. 
31, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/01/31/usa-trade-lng-idUSL1N0AZMTU20130131 
(highlighting the conflict between companies that have benefited from low natural gas prices and 
business groups that are concerned about a WTO challenge in light of the Chinese export cases); 
James Bacchus, U.S. Should Rethink Restrictions on Natural Gas Exports, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Aug. 
19, 2013), http://www.ibtimes.com/fighting-words/us-should-rethink-restrictions-natural-gas-
exports-1390823 (highlighting the Congressional debate over natural gas export restrictions); Jim 
Snyder & Mark Drajem, Oil Industry May Invoke Trade Law to Challenge Export Ban, 
BLOOMBERG (Nov. 6, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-11-06/oil-industry-may-
invoke-trade-law-to-challenge-export-ban.html (citing the oil industry’s challenge to export 
restrictions); Daniel J. Ikenson, WTO Indictment of Chinese Export Restrictions Unearths U.S. 
Hypocrisy, CATO INST.: CATO AT LIBERTY (Apr. 1, 2014, 10:06 AM), http://www.cato.org/ 
blog/wto-indictment-chinese-export-restrictions-unearths-us-hypocrisy (calling the U.S. challenge 
to Chinese export restrictions “hypocrisy” while the United States continues to restrict energy 
exports). 
 59. See generally The GATT Years: From Havana to Marrakesh, WORLD TRADE ORG.: 
UNDERSTANDING THE WTO, https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact5_e.htm 
(last visited Aug. 4, 2016). 
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member nations are expected to abide by when trading with other member 
nations.60  Under these trade provisions, WTO members are prohibited from 
imposing restrictions on exports among WTO members unless certain limited 
exceptions apply.61 
Article I of the GATT, the “most favored nation” clause, dictates: “[A]ny 
advantage, favour, privilege or immunity granted by any [WTO Member] to any 
product originating in or destined for any other country shall be accorded 
immediately and unconditionally to the like product originating in or destined 
for the territories of all other [WTO Members].” 62   This nondiscrimination 
clause applies to any policies WTO members implement regulating commodity 
imports and exports.  It also requires that if exports are treated a certain way in 
regards to exporting a commodity to one WTO member country, the same 
privileges and treatment must be extended to all other member countries.63  
Further, Article XI of the GATT bars any export prohibitions between WTO 
member nations other than duties, taxes, or other charges, regardless of whether 
the prohibitions are implemented through quotas or import or export licenses.64 
D.  The WTO Allows for the Implementation of Restrictive Trade Policies 
under Certain Circumstances 
The WTO does allow for exceptions to Articles I and XI of the GATT in 
certain circumstances.  If a country with prohibitive export policies can 
successfully argue the policy falls within one of the WTO exceptions, there may 
be no violation of international trade commitments.65 
Under Article XI: 2(a) of the GATT, restrictive export policies may be 
acceptable if they are necessary to prevent or relieve a critical shortage of the 
product.66  Specifically, Article XI: 2(a) allows for “[e]xport prohibitions or 
restrictions [to be] temporarily applied to prevent or relieve critical shortages of 
foodstuff or other products essential to the exporting contracting party.” 67  
However, this exception requires the export prohibition be “primarily aimed” at 
                                                 
 60. See The Uruguay Round, WORLD TRADE ORG.: UNDERSTANDING THE WTO, http:// 
www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact5_e.htm (last visited Aug. 4, 2016). 
 61. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, art. XI., Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 
U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT]. 
 62. Id. at art. I. (alteration in original). 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. at art. XI (specifying that trade prohibitions cannot be enforced through licensing 
procedures).  While GATT generally prohibits licensing requirements, a WTO panel has found that 
a license approved within five days may not constitute a restriction.  Report of the Panel, Japan—
Trade in Semi-Conductors, ¶ 118, L/6309 (Mar. 24, 1988), GATT B.I.S.D. (35th Supp.), at 31 
(1989). 
 65. GATT, supra note 61, at arts. XI, XIV, XX, XXI. 
 66. GATT, supra note 61, at art. XI 2(b). 
 67. Id. at art. XI 2(a) (alteration in original). 
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conservation of the product, 68  and is mainly used to manage and conserve 
agricultural products.69 
Article XX of the GATT, which has often been used for environmental 
management purposes, provides a variety of mechanisms that allow a country to 
argue that the imposition of restrictive trade policies serve a legitimate purpose, 
such as to “protect public morals,” or “human, animal or plant life or health.”70  
Under this article, trade restrictions may also be valid if they are imposed for the 
“protection of national treasures of artistic, historic or archaeological value,” or 
if they relate “to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such 
measures are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic 
production or consumption.”71 
More narrowly, under Article XX(b) of the GATT an export restriction may 
be acceptable if the restriction is in place to protect human, animal or plant life, 
or health.72  The WTO Appellate Body has analyzed the applicability of an 
Article XX(b) claim as follows: 
For an Article XX(b) claim, a panel should begin the sequence of 
analysis by considering whether the challenged measure fits within the 
scope of a particular paragraph in Article XX, and whether the 
purported state interest in preventing a risk is genuine.  Then the panel 
looks for the required ‘degree of connection’ specified in the 
paragraph (e.g., ‘necessary’).73 
In United States—Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline,74 
the WTO Panel created a three-part test a defending country must meet in order 
to argue an Article XX(b) restriction successfully. 75   The country must 
successfully show: 
                                                 
 68. See generally Report of the Panel, Canada—Measures Affecting Exports of Unprocessed 
Herring and Salmon, ¶ 4.7, L/6268 (Nov. 20, 1987), GATT B.I.S.D. (35th Supp.), at 12 (1989) 
[hereinafter Report of the Panel, Exports of Herring and Salmon] (rejecting Canada’s Article XI 
2(a) argument because their prohibitive export policies regulating herring and salmon were not 
“primarily aimed” at conserving the resource). 
 69. GIOVANNI ANANIA, INT’L CTR. FOR TRADE AND SUSTAINABLE DEV., AGRICULTURAL 
EXPORT RESTRICTIONS AND THE WTO: WHAT OPTIONS DO POLICY-MAKERS HAVE FOR 
PROMOTING FOOD SECURITY 16 (Nov. 2013), http://www.ictsd.org/downloads/2013/11/agri 
cultural-export-restrictions-and-the-wto-what-options-do-policy-makers.pdf. 
 70. GATT, supra note 61, at art. XX. 
 71. Id. at art. XX(f)–(g). 
 72. Id. at art. XX(b). 
 73. Steve Charnovitz, Trade and the Environment in the WTO 16 (Geo. Wash. Sch. of Law 
Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working Paper, Paper No. 338, 2007). 
 74. Panel Report, United States—Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, 
¶ 2.6, WTO Doc. WT/DS2/R (adopted Jan. 29, 1996) [hereinafter Panel Report, Standards for 
Gasoline]. 
 75. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, WORLD TRADE ORG.: WTO ANALYTICAL 
INDEX, http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/analytic_index_e/gatt1994_07_e.htm#artic 
le20 (last visited Aug. 5, 2016). 
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(1) that the policy in respect of the measures for which the provision 
was invoked fell within the range of policies designed to protect 
human, animal or plant life or health; (2) that the inconsistent 
measures for which the exception was being invoked were necessary 
to fulfill the policy objective; and (3) that the measures were applied 
in conformity with the requirements of the introductory clause of 
Article XX.76 
The crux of this analysis is the determination of whether the restriction is 
“necessary” to meet its intended purpose of protecting life or health; the validity 
of many prohibitive export policies has been decided based on this analysis.77  
The burden is on the country arguing the validity of the restriction to prove, by 
means of a balancing test, that the restriction is either “indispensable” or 
“justifiable”.  The balancing test’s factors include: “1) the relative importance 
of the common interests or value pursued by the measure, (2) the contribution 
made by the measure to the realization of the ends pursued by it, and (3) the 
restrictive impact of the measure on international commerce.”78 
Under Article XX(g) of the GATT, export restrictions may be appropriate if 
the restriction is necessary to conserve an exhaustible natural resource and if the 
restriction is implemented “in conjunction with restrictions on domestic 
production or consumptions.” 79   In order to argue that the Article XX(g) 
                                                 
 76. Id. 
 77. Charnovitz, supra note 73, at 17.  Compare Appellate Body Report, European 
Communities—Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products, ¶¶ 164, 168, 175, 
WTO Doc. WT/DS135/AB/R (adopted Mar. 12, 2001) [hereinafter Appellate Body Report, 
Measures Affecting Asbestos] (noting that a French ban on the import of asbestos and products 
containing asbestos was necessary for the protection of human health and there was “no reasonably 
available alternative”), and Appellate Body Report, Brazil—Measures Affecting Imports of 
Retreaded Tyres, ¶¶ 155, 211, WTO Doc. WT/DS332/AB/R (adopted Dec. 3, 2007) [hereinafter 
Appellate Body Report, Imports of Retreaded Tyres] (upholding a Brazilian ban on the import of 
retreaded tires because it was “necessary” to accomplish Brazil’s goal of reducing tire waste, the 
disposal of which had detrimental effects to the environment and human health), with Report of the 
Panel, Thailand—Restrictions on Importation of and International Taxes on Cigarettes, ¶ 75, 
DS10/R (Oct. 5, 1990), GATT B.I.S.D. (37th  Supp.), at 21 (1991) [hereinafter Report of the Panel, 
Restrictions on Cigarettes] (finding taxes and restrictions Thailand imposed on imported cigarettes 
were not “necessary” to Thailand’s stated goal of protecting its citizens from chemicals in 
cigarettes, particularly since the sale of cigarettes produced in Thailand were not restricted in any 
way), and Panel Report, Standards for Gasoline, supra note 74, at ¶¶ 6.21-22, 6.29 (finding 
regulations applied by the United States on gasoline imported from other countries was not 
“necessary” to protect U.S. citizens from air pollution partly because domestically produced 
gasoline did not have to meet the same strict chemical composition standards). 
 78. Charnovitz, supra note 73, at 17–19.  Adding more difficulty to proving the necessity of 
the restrictive trade policy, if the challenging country can show a “reasonably available alternative 
measure” will be less restrictive on trade, the WTO will likely find the defendant country’s 
restrictive policy unjustifiable.  Christopher Doyle, Gimme Shelter: The “Necessary” Element of 
GATT Article XX in the Contest of the China-Audiovisual Products Case, 29 B.U. INT’L L.J. 143, 
163 (2011). 
 79. GATT, supra note 61, at art. XX(g). 
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exemption applies, the defending country must prove the restriction relates to an 
exhaustible natural resource.  A resource may be considered “exhaustible” if 
both parties to the dispute mutually agree that the resource is exhaustible, or if 
the WTO has previously recognized the designation. 80   Additionally, the 
restrictive measure must relate to the conservation of the resource, and the 
measure must be enacted “in conjunction with [conservation] restrictions on 
domestic production or consumption.”81 
Despite this exception, Articles XI and XX are not standalone defenses for 
restrictive export policies.82  If an exception is argued, Article XIII then requires 
the restriction be applied in a non-discriminatory manner, which means the 
restriction must be applied equally to all trading partners and not merely to 
certain parties.83 
If a country cannot successfully argue an exception under Article XI or XX, 
Article XXI provides another avenue for restrictive export policies.84  Under 
Article XXI, the “national security exception,” a restrictive export policy may 
be valid if the member nation is enacting the policy as a way to take “action 
which it considers necessary for the protection of its essential security 
interests.” 85    An action that a member nation considers “necessary” is a 
subjective standard, as it is the decision of the WTO member nation itself to 
determine what actions are “necessary” for the protection of their “essential” 
security interests.86 
A WTO panel has never ruled on the national security exception, making it 
both the most broad and unclear exception as to what exactly would qualify for 
                                                 
 80. Charnovitz, supra note 73, at 20.  The WTO has found that the term “exhaustible natural 
resource” should not be strictly interpreted, but instead interpreted as an “evolutionary” term that 
should be considered “in light of contemporary concerns of the community of nations about the 
protection and conservation of the environment.”  Id. at 20–22; see Appellate Body Report, United 
States—Import Prohibitions of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, ¶ 128, WTO Doc. 
WT/DS58/AB/R (adopted Oct. 12, 1998) [hereinafter Appellate Body Report, Import Prohibitions 
of Shrimp] (stating that shrimp is likely an exhaustible natural resource); see also Report of the 
Panel, United States—Prohibitions of Imports of Tuna and Tuna Products from Canada, ¶ 4.9, 
L/5198 (Dec. 22, 1981), GATT B.I.S.D. (29th Supp.) (1982) [hereinafter Report of the Panel, 
Prohibitions of Imports of Tuna] (noting that both parties to the dispute mutually agreed tuna was 
an exhaustible natural resource and conservation management measures should be implemented). 
 81. Charnovitz, supra note 73, at 20 (alteration in original).  To determine whether the 
restriction is “reasonably related” to conservation, the WTO has historically “examined the 
relationship between the general structure/design of the measure and the conservation policy goal 
it purports to serve.”  Id.  The third qualification, that the restriction be implemented in conjunction 
with domestic production or consumption restrictions, has been interpreted to require 
“evenhandedness between the regulation of imports and domestic activity.” Id. at 23. 
 82. Compare GATT, supra note 61, at art. XI, and art. XX, with art. XIII. 
 83. GATT, supra note 61, at art. XIII. 
 84. Id. at art. XXI. 
 85. Id. 
 86. VANN ET. AL., supra note 56, at 11. 
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it.87  However, the United States has taken the position that this exception is 
“self-judging”, which means the member nation invoking this exception is 
considered the best judge of whether or not its export policy is valid and qualifies 
for this exception.88  Despite the United States’ interpretation of this exception, 
the question remains whether a WTO panel would simply defer to the country 
itself to make the decision as to what policies are necessary and essential to its 
national security interests.89 
II.  ATTEMPTS TO DEFEND SIMILAR EXPORT POLICIES HAVE BEEN 
UNSUCCESSFUL AND IT IS UNLIKELY THE UNITED STATES CAN SUCCESSFULLY 
ARGUE A TRADE EXEMPTION APPLIES 
A.  The WTO Has Ruled Against Analogous Export Policies 
Although the United States continues to maintain strict licensing requirements 
for natural gas exports to WTO member nations in the absence of a free trade 
agreement, in 2009 the United States along with Mexico, the European Union, 
Canada, Turkey, and other WTO member nations, initiated a WTO challenge 
against similarly restrictive Chinese policies regulating exports of raw materials 
to WTO member nations.90  The United States challenged Chinese policies such 
as export quotas,91 export duties,92 and the imposition of export licenses that 
unfairly restricted the export of these commodities.93  The United States argued 
that Chinese export policies imposing limits on the amount of raw materials that 
can be exported disadvantaged U.S. and foreign manufacturers in industries that 
relied on these raw materials to produce downstream products such as steel, 
                                                 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id.; see Dapo Akande & Sope Williams, International Adjudication on National Security 
Interests: What Role for the WTO? 43 VA. J. INT’L L. 365, 375–77 (2003). 
 89. VANN ET. AL., supra note 56, at 11–12. 
 90. Bacchus, supra note 58; WTO Case Challenging China’s Export Restraints on Raw 
Material Inputs, OFFICE OF THE U.S TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, http://www.ustr.gov/about-
us/press-office/fact-sheets/2009/june/wto-case-challenging-chinas-export-restraints-raw-material 
(last visited July 28, 2016) [hereinafter Challenging China’s Export Restraints] (the policies being 
challenged were export policies regulating the export of magnesium, coke, zinc, and others). 
 91. Challenging China’s Export Restraints, supra note 90. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id.  The United States argued WTO rules prohibit a WTO member from imposing export 
quotas and licensing requirements.  Id. Further, the U.S. argued that when China joined the WTO 
it made a commitment to free trade practices, not to implement prohibitive trade policies. 
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aluminum, and chemicals.94  Interestingly, the United States specifically pointed 
out that WTO rules prohibit “export restraints such as export licensing”.95 
China responded by arguing that their export policies fell under the general 
exceptions included in Article XX of the GATT.96  Specifically, they argued that 
these export restrictions were in place to prevent a critical shortage of these 
materials and that the restrictions were aimed at conservation and environmental 
management of the resources in question.97  In January 2012, the WTO found 
that China’s export policies violated the international trade obligations they had 
agreed to abide by when joining the WTO in 2001.98  In 2013, China reported to 
the WTO that its policies regarding these materials had been brought into 
compliance with WTO rules.99 
A second United States challenge to restrictive Chinese export policies 
yielded similar results in 2012.100  Along with Japan, the European Union, and 
several other nations, the United States argued Chinese export policies limiting 
the export of rare earth minerals violated WTO rules.101  Rare earth minerals are 
essential to manufacture products such as mobile phones, computers, 
automobiles, and televisions.102  As one of the largest global suppliers of these 
minerals, China’s restrictive export policies, such as export duties and quotas, 
not only violated its WTO commitments to other WTO member nations but also 
discriminated against U.S. manufacturers.103  Restrictive Chinese export policies 
                                                 
 94. Id.  The United States used the pricing example of coke, a material used in the steel 
industry, in making their argument.  Id.  In 2008, China produced 60% of the global supply of coke, 
which was 335 million metric tons.  Id.  Chinese export quotas limiting exports to 12 million metric 
tons and a duty rate of 40% caused the price of coke to increase to $740 per metric ton for global 
producers.  Id.  Meanwhile, Chinese domestic producers were only paying $472 per metric ton, 
giving Chinese manufacturers a significant competitive advantage over their international 
counterparts.  Id. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Appellate Body Report, China—Measures Related to the Exportation of Various Raw 
Materials, ¶ 28, WTO Doc. WT/DS394/AB/R (adopted Feb. 22, 2012). 
 97. Id. ¶ 40. 
 98. China—Measures Related to the Exportation of Various Raw Materials, WORLD TRADE 
ORG.: DISPUTE SETTLEMENT, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds394_e.htm 
(last visited Aug. 1, 2016). 
 99. Id. 
 100. Press Release, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, United States Challenges China’s 
Export Restraints on Rare Earths (Mar. 2012), http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/press-
releases/2012/march/united-states-challenges-china%E2%80%99s-export-restraints-r. 
 101. Id.; Rare Earths Statistics and Information, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, http://minerals. 
usgs.gov/minerals/pubs/commodity/rare_earths/ (last visited Aug. 1, 2016) (noting that rare earth 
minerals are seventeen elements on the periodic table used in a wide variety of industries and 
products).  The policies challenged limited exports of these elements.  Daniel Pruzin, WTO Rules 
Against China on Rare Earth Export Restrictions, BNA (Mar. 28, 2014), http://www.bna.com/wto-
rules-against-n17179889210/. 
 102. Pruzin, supra note 101. 
 103. Press Release, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, United States Wins Victory in 
Rare Earth Dispute with China: WTO Report Finds China’s Export Restraints Breach WTO Rules 
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resulted in American manufacturers paying three times more for rare earth 
minerals than Chinese manufacturers—an outcome prohibited by WTO rules 
that require member nations to ensure equal and nondiscriminatory treatment 
when trading with other WTO member nations.104 
In defending its rare earth export policies, China argued that export duties on 
rare earth mineral were implemented for environmental reasons and qualified 
for an exception under Article XX(b) of the GATT.105  China further argued that 
export quotas on rare earth minerals were permissible as restrictions necessary 
for the conservation of exhaustible natural resources under Article XX(g) of the 
GATT.106  Again ruling against China, the WTO concluded that China’s export 
restrictions were inconsistent with WTO international trade policies and that 
China failed to justify its export restrictions as qualifying for an exception to 
WTO rules.107 
B.  It is Unlikely the United States Can Successfully Argue a WTO Exemption 
Applies to Current Policies 
In light of the two recent WTO cases against China, it has become increasingly 
clear that U.S. policies restricting the export of LNG likely violate the United 
States’ international trade obligations as a member of the WTO.108  Based on 
Articles I and XI of the GATT, current U.S. export policies that regulate the 
export of LNG likely violate the nondiscriminatory trade policies the United 
States agreed to abide by as an WTO member.109 
LNG export applications are subject to lengthy and burdensome licensing 
procedures that prohibit the efficient export of LNG to other WTO member 
                                                 
(Mar. 2014), http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/press-releases/2014/March/US-wins-vict 
ory-in-rare-earths-dispute-with-China. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Press Release, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, U.S. Trade Representative 
Michael Froman Announces U.S. Victory in Challenge to China’s Rare Earth Export Restraints 
(Aug. 2014), http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/press-releases/2014/August/USTR-Fro 
man-US-Victory-in-Challenge-to-China-Rare-Earth-Export-Restraints. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. (reporting that China could not justify its export restrictions as necessary to conserve 
an exhaustible natural resource and they were not “legitimate . . . environmental protection 
measures”). 
 108. See generally GEORGE DAVID BANKS, AM. COUNCIL FOR CAPITAL FORMATION, U.S. 
RESOURCE NATIONALISM: THE IMPACT OF ENERGY TRADE RESTRICTIONS ON NATIONAL 
SECURITY 4 (July 2015), http://unlockcrudeexports.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/ACCF-
Nationalism-Report_FINAL.pdf; Joe Fisher, U.S. LNG Process an Affront to Free Trade, WTO 
Expert Says, NAT. GAS INTELLIGENCE (Dec. 3, 2013), http://www.naturalgasintel.com/ 
articles/96608-us-lng-process-an-affront-to-free-trade-wto-expert-says. 
 109. Fisher, supra note 108 (highlighting that nations that could take a case to the WTO 
challenging a country’s trade policies often choose not to for political reasons, and a WTO 
challenge to U.S. LNG export restrictions would likely be successful). 
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nations if there is no FTA in place.110  Notably, in its challenge against Chinese 
export restrictions for raw materials, the United States successfully argued that 
WTO rules specifically prohibit export restraints such as licensing.111  Yet the 
DOE subjects LNG export applications (to WTO, non-FTA countries) to lengthy 
licensing procedures while simultaneously fast-tracking approvals for 
applications for LNG exports to FTA countries based on a national interest 
determination. 112   These different approval processes result in disparate 
treatment among WTO member nations, which is specifically prohibited in the 
nondiscrimination clause of Article I of the GATT.  Furthermore, Article XI of 
the GATT specifically bars the imposition of export licenses among WTO 
member nations.113 
If U.S. export policies are challenged, in order for the United States to comply 
with its international trade obligations, it would have to argue successfully that 
these policies qualify for an exception to WTO trade rules. 114   If a WTO 
challenge to U.S. LNG policies were pursued by another member nation, it is 
unlikely the United States can successfully argue that a WTO exception applies 
to current U.S. policies governing the export of natural gas. 
The first exception the United States would likely argue is that under Article 
XI: 2(a), the restriction is necessary to prevent a shortage of the product.115  In 
order to argue this exception successfully, the defending country bears the 
burden of proof to show: 1) the restriction is temporary, 2) the restriction will 
relieve a critical shortage of the product, and 3) the product is essential to the 
exporting country.116 
First, it is unlikely the United States would be able to convince a WTO Panel 
that a decades-long export licensing procedure for LNG is merely a “temporary” 
restriction as the ban and licensing procedures have been in place for decades.117  
Second, in deciding the China—Measures Related to the Exportation of Various 
Raw Materials 118  case, the WTO Appellate Body found the term “critical 
shortage” “refers to those situations or events that may be relieved or prevented 
through the application of measures on a temporary, and not indefinite or 
                                                 
 110. Goldwyn, supra note 35; Letter from Margo Thorning, Ph.D., Senior Vice President and 
Chief Economist, American Council for Capital Formation, to Michale Froman, U.S. Trade 
Representative, (May 7, 2014), http://actonlng.org/2014/05/act-on-lng-encourages-ustr-to-support-
expedited-lng-exports. 
 111. DUNN, supra note 19, at 2–3. 
 112. Id. at 4–6. 
 113. GATT, supra note 61, at arts. I, XI. 
 114. Id. at art. XI: 2(a) (stating that prohibitions of Article XI are subject to certain exceptions). 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. 
 117. See supra Section I.A–B. 
 118. Appellate Body Report, China—Measures Related to the Exportation of Various Raw 
Materials, WTO Docs. WT/DS394/AB/R, WT/DS395/AB/R, WT/DS398/AB/R (adopted Feb. 22, 
2012). 
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permanent, basis.” 119   It is highly unlikely the WTO would accept a U.S. 
argument that there is a “critical shortage” of natural gas, as production of 
natural gas in the United States is steadily increasing.120  Third, in the China—
Measures Related to the Exportation of Various Raw Materials case, when 
determining whether a product is “essential,” the WTO Appellate Body found 
that the determination is not solely at the discretion of the WTO member to 
decide what products are “essential” to the country; particular circumstances 
faced by the member nation at the time could be taken into account.121  While 
the United States may be able to argue LNG is “essential” to the national 
economy, it is unlikely the United States can argue particular circumstances exist 
today that warrant such restrictive export policies on this commodity.122  As a 
result, it is unlikely the United States can argue current export restrictions 
qualify for an Article XI: 2(a) exception. 
Next, the United States could attempt to argue the policies fall under an Article 
XX exemption.123  Under Article XX(b), an export restriction would be valid if 
it is in place to protect human, animal, or plant life.124  Generally, countries 
attempting to defend a restrictive trade policy under this Article have had 
extremely low success rates.  The only significant victory came from a challenge 
over a French import ban on asbestos and goods containing asbestos in which 
the WTO Appellate Body found each country has a “right to determine the level 
                                                 
 119. Panel Report, China—Measures Related To The Exportation Of Various Raw Materials, 
¶ 7.306, WTO Docs. WT/DS394/R, WT/DS395/R, WT/DS398/R (adopted July 5, 2011); see 
Report of the Panel, Exports of Herring and Salmon, supra note 68, at ¶ 4.7 (finding Canadian 
export prohibitions on salmon and herring were not “primarily aimed at the conservation of salmon 
and herring” because they only limited foreign, not domestic, access to the fish and only restricted 
access to unprocessed salmon and herring); see also Report of the Panel, United States—
Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, ¶ 5.33, DS21/R (Sept. 3, 1991) (not adopted) (showing that a 
GATT panel found a U.S. ban on certain tuna imports from Mexico did not meet the XX(g) 
requirements because the dolphin take rate Mexico had to meet in order to export tuna products to 
the U.S. was the same as the take rate in the U.S.  Because this was an unpredictable standard, the 
Panel found this import restriction was not “primarily aimed” at dolphin conservation). 
 120. U.S. Natural Gas Marketed Production, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., 
https://www.eia.gov/dnav/ng/hist/n9050us2a.htm (last visited July 24, 2016) (showing a steady 
increase in production of natural gas in the United States); Press Release, Int’l Energy Agency, 
North America Leads Shift in Global Energy Balance, IEA Says in Latest World Energy Outlook 
(Nov. 12, 2012), http://www.iea.org/newsroomandevents/pressreleases/2012/november/name,330 
15,en.html. 
 121. Appellate Body Report, China—Measures Related to the Exportation of Various Raw 
Materials, ¶¶ 7.276, 7.282, WTO Docs. WT/DS394/AB/R, WT/DS395/AB/R, WT/DS398/AB/R 
(adopted Feb. 22, 2012) (finding also that products which are “input” products to a particular 
product or industry may also be deemed “essential” for Article XI: 2(a) purposes). 
 122. U.S. Natural Gas Marketed Production, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., 
https://www.eia.gov/dnav/ng/hist/n9050us2a.htm (last visited July 24, 2016) (showing production 
steadily rising, making it unlikely for the United States to successfully argue that there are 
circumstances that warrant restrictive export policies). 
 123. GATT, supra note 61, at art. XX. 
 124. Id. at art. XX(b). 
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of protection of health that they consider appropriate in a given situation” and 
that “no reasonably available alternative measure” existed.125 
The “necessary” prong of the three-part test has been very difficult for 
countries to prove.  Many Article XX(b) arguments have failed this prong and 
thus it would be a very difficult argument for the United States to make.126  Not 
only would the United States have to prove that both the ban on crude exports 
and the lengthy licensing process for natural gas exports are in place to “protect 
human, animal, or plant life”, but it would have to further prove these restrictions 
are “necessary” and there is “no reasonably available alternative measure” that 
could possibly meet this goal. 127   This high standard of proof is nearly 
impossible for the United States to meet in this instance. 
Similarly, Article XX(g) provides an exception for restrictive policies that are 
necessary to conserve an exhaustible natural resource if the restrictions are 
“effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or 
consumption.”128  In order to argue that this exception applies, the defending 
country must show that the trade restrictions relate to the conservation of an 
exhaustible natural resource and must be enacted with restrictions on domestic 
production or consumption.129  Again, this has typically been a difficult standard 
to meet. 
In determining whether trade restrictions relate to conservation, the WTO has 
found trade measures do not have to be “necessary or essential” to conservation 
of the resource, but they must be “primarily aimed” at conservation.130  It would 
be difficult for the United States, in a time of increasing production, to argue 
that current policies regulating the export of crude oil and LNG are “primarily 
aimed” at conservation.  This is particularly so because of the disparate treatment 
countries receive in DOE’s approval of LNG exports, which links the approval 
                                                 
 125. Appellate Body Report, Measures Affecting Asbestos, supra note 77, at ¶¶ 168, 175. 
 126. See Panel Report, Standards for Gasoline, supra note 74, at ¶¶ 6.1–.3, 6.26, 6.28–.29 
(finding discriminatory trade policies the United States enacted through the Clean Air Act that 
treated imported gasoline different than domestic gasoline were “not necessary under Article 
XX(b)”); Report of the Panel, Restrictions on Cigarettes, supra note 77, at ¶¶ 76, 79 (finding Thai 
prohibitions on importing foreign cigarettes due to chemical additives were not “necessary” to 
protect human health because there were no restrictions on domestically produced cigarettes).  But 
see, Appellate Body Report, Imports of Retreaded Tyres, supra note 77, at ¶ 155 (finding that 
Brazil’s prohibition on the importation of retreaded tires did qualify for an exception under XX(b) 
because there were no reasonable alternatives available and the ban was a “key element” of Brazil’s 
strategy to generate fewer waste tires). 
 127. See Appellate Body Report, Imports of Retreaded Tyres, supra note 77, at ¶ 156; GATT, 
supra note 61, at art. XX(b). 
 128. GATT, supra note 61, at art. XX(g). 
 129. Id. 
 130. See generally Report of the Panel, United States—Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, ¶ 5.33, 
DS21/R (Sept. 3, 1991) (not adopted). 
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time of the permit not to conservation of the resource, but to whether or not a 
free trade agreement is in place with the destination country.131 
The strongest argument the United States has in arguing an Article XX(g) 
exemption is that LNG may be considered an “exhaustible natural resource.”132  
Not only has the definition of “exhaustible natural resource” been interpreted 
broadly to include both living and non-living resources, but also WTO panels 
have been deferential to the parties in circumstances where both parties in the 
dispute agree that the product in question is an “exhaustible natural resource”.133  
Further bolstering the U.S. argument that LNG is an “exhaustible natural 
resource” is the WTO decision in United States – Import Prohibition of Certain 
Shrimp and Shrimp Products,134 in which the Appellate Body specifically lists 
similar commodities, petroleum and iron ore, as “exhaustible natural 
resources.”135 
While the United States can likely argue LNG is an “exhaustible natural 
resource,” they will still lose on the second Article X(g) requirement—that the 
trade restriction be implemented in conjunction with domestic production or 
consumptions restrictions.136  The WTO has interpreted this requirement in the 
most simple fashion: if no domestic restrictions are in place, the country cannot 
justify its international trade restriction on the product under XX(g).  But if there 
are restrictions in place, it may be justifiable if the other two qualifications are 
met.137  The United States has not enacted any federal restrictions on domestic 
production or consumption of natural gas.  The legislative history of the Natural 
Gas Act shows it was enacted not for conservation purposes but to “regulate 
monopolistic practices in the natural gas market.”138  As a result, it will likely 
fail this prong of the analysis and thus the United States will be unable to 
successfully argue the restrictions are valid under Article XX(g). 
                                                 
 131. Natural gas production has increased from 21,112,053 million cubic feet in 2008 to 
25,690,878 million cubic feet in 2013. Natural Gas Wellhead Value and Marketed Production, 
U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., http://www.eia.gov/dnav/ng/ng_prod_whv_dcu_nus_a.htm (last 
visited Aug. 1, 2016); see VANN ET. AL., supra note 56, at 2-3 (explaining the difference in the 
permit process between FTA and non-FTA countries). 
 132. GATT, supra note 61, at art. XX(g). 
 133. Appellate Body Report, Import Prohibitions on Shrimp, supra note 80, at ¶ 128; see also 
Report of the Panel, Prohibitions on Imports of Tuna, supra note 80, at ¶ 4.9; Report of the Panel, 
Exports of Herring and Salmon, supra note 68, at ¶ 4.4 (agreeing with the parties that the product 
in question was an “exhaustible natural resource”). 
 134. See Appellate Body Report, Import Prohibitions on Shrimp, supra note 80, at ¶ 128. 
 135. Id. 
 136. GATT, supra note 61, at art. XX(g). 
 137. Report of the Panel, Prohibitions on Imports of Tuna, supra note 80, at ¶ 3.17 (finding 
that the United States’ restrictions on tuna imports from Canada were unjustifiable because there 
were no corresponding domestic restrictions on tuna production or consumption).  Canadian export 
restrictions on salmon and herring did not entirely fulfill the XX(g) test, but met the requirement 
of domestic production restrictions because Canada also restricted domestic harvests.  Report of 
the Panel, Exports of Herring and Salmon, supra note 68, at ¶ 4.4. 
 138. BACCHUS & JEONG, supra note 14, at 12. 
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However, if the United States can successfully argue current export policies 
qualify for an exception under Article XX, Article XIII of the GATT requires 
the restriction be applied in a nondiscriminatory manner—which means the 
restriction must be applied equally to all trading partners. 139   Rather than 
applying export restrictions equally among trading partners, the United States 
has implemented disparate licensing requirements and has expedited the 
exportation of natural gas to certain nations while delaying exportation to 
others.140 
The “national security exemption” in Article XXI holds the greatest 
possibility of success for the United States.  Under Article XXI, a member nation 
may take “any action which it considers necessary for the protection of its 
essential security interests”, which can extend to restrictive export 
regulations.141  This is a subjective standard, making it the most flexible of the 
WTO exemptions, as the WTO member may take whatever measures it 
considers “necessary” for the protection of its “essential” security interests.142  
The WTO has not yet attempted to judge the validity of these measures. 
The United States has taken the position that this exception is “self-judging,” 
meaning the member nation invoking the exception is the best judge in deciding 
if the exception is valid.143  The United States’ position that the WTO member 
nation itself determines whether its export restriction is necessary for national 
security purposes would be most useful for the United States to defend its own 
export restrictions; however, a WTO panel has never ruled on this exemption.144 
Considering the current global turmoil in regions that produce and import 
significant quantities of natural gas, the national security exemption is the 
strongest argument the United States can make to defend its current LNG export 
                                                 
 139. GATT, supra note 61, at art. XIII; see Panel Report, European Communities—Regime for 
the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas—Complaint by the United States, ¶ 7.69, WTO 
Doc. WT/DS27/R/USA (adopted May 22, 1997) (explaining that restrictions should apply equally 
to all members). 
 140. 15 U.S.C. § 717b(c) (2006); 15 C.F.R. §754.2 (2011). 
 141. GATT, supra note 61, at art. XXI. 
 142. VANN ET. AL., supra note 56, at 11–12, 14; WORLD TRADE ORG., GATT ANALYTICAL 
INDEX 601 (1995), http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/gatt_ai_e/art21_e.pdf (citing a 
panel report, which was not adopted, regarding the imposition of an embargo the United States 
enacted against Nicaragua where the Panel held “the Panel cannot examine or judge the validity of 
motivation for the invocation of Article XXI(b)(iii) by the United States.”). 
 143. See Akande & Williams, supra note 88, at 376.  At a 1982 meeting discussing trade 
regulations, multiple countries had enacted restrictions of Argentinian imports.  The Canadian 
representative stated, “Canada’s sovereign action was to be seen as a political response to a political 
issue . . . the GATT had neither the competence nor the responsibility to deal with the political issue 
that had been raised.”  WORLD TRADE ORG., GATT ANALYTICAL INDEX 600 (1995), http://www. 
wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/gatt_ai_e/art21_e.pdf.  The U.S. representative stated, “The 
General Agreement left to each contracting party the judgment as to what it considered to be 
necessary to protect its security interests.  The contracting parties had no power to question that 
judgment.”  Id. at 600–01. 
 144. VANN ET. AL., supra note 56, at 11. 
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restrictions as being necessary to the national security of the United States.145  
The United States could, for example, argue that restricting LNG exports to Iran 
would fall within the national security exemption.146 
However, it should be noted that the United States’ case for a national security 
exemption would be extremely narrow considering there are arguments that 
overturning the current restrictive permitting process and allowing producers to 
freely export LNG would actually be beneficial to the national security of the 
United States. 147   For example, recent global conflicts involving Russian 
intervention in Ukraine and Syria have refocused the natural gas debate and led 
to a call for the United States to counter Russian energy dominance in the region 
with its own natural gas exports.148  The United States might plausibly claim 
LNG export restrictions serve a valid national security purpose; however, 
overcoming the contradicting argument that easing export restrictions would 
benefit national security may prove to be insurmountable.149  Ultimately, the 
lack of any definitive precedential rulings make it impossible to tell what test a 
WTO panel would apply to a claimed exemption under Article XXI.150 
                                                 
 145. Lewis E. Leibowitz & C. Kyle Simpson, Move Quickly on LNG Exports, OIL & GAS FIN. 
JOURNAL (Nov. 12, 2013), http://www.ogfj.com/articles/print/volume-10/issue-11/features/move-
quickly-on-lng-exports.html (“[N]ational security is clearly a valid reason to impose export 
restrictions.”). 
 146. Id. (suggesting that while export restrictions to Iran or Cuba may be valid, restrictions 
limiting exports to other non-FTA countries, such as Japan, India, or Haiti, would likely not pass 
the national security test). 
 147. Rep. Mike Turner, Exporting American natural gas boosts economy and national 
security, THE HILL (Oct. 22, 2013), http://thehill.com/opinion/op-ed/329999-exporting-american-
natural-gas-boosts-economy-and-national-security (highlighting the fact that many American allies 
are dependent on unstable regions or unfriendly countries, such as Russia, for their natural gas 
imports); see also ELIZABETH ROSENBERG, CTR. FOR A NEW AM. SECURITY, ENERGY RUSH: 
SHALE PRODUCTION AND U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY 9 (2014), http://www.cnas.org/sites/default/ 
files/publications-pdf/CNAS_EnergyBoom_Rosenberg_0.pdf. 
 148. Jordan Weissmann, Frack You, Putin: Could the U.S. battle Russia with natural gas 
exports?, SLATE (Mar. 7, 2014), http://www.slate.com/articles/business/moneybox/2014/03/putin_ 
ukraine_and_energy_could_u_s_natural_gas_exports_alter_the_geopolitical.html; see Turner, 
supra note 147 (highlighting prior problems with Russian dominance in the global energy market, 
such as the fact that in 2006 and 2009, Russia cut off natural gas supplies to several European 
nations). 
 149. New Paper Examines Harmful Impact of Energy Trade Policies on National Security, PR 
NEWSWIRE (July 15, 2015), http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/new-paper-examines-
harmful-impact-of-energy-trade-policies-on-national-security-300113730.html; BANKS, supra 
note 108. 
 150. Akande & Williams, supra note 88, at 373 (considering if a GATT/WTO panel should 
analyze whether a national security exemption invoked by a member is legitimate or if it should be 
up to the state to decide what actions should be taken in the interests of their own national security). 
2016] Natural Gas Export Regulations and Trade Obligations 827 
III.  STATUTORY INTERPRETATION OR LEGISLATIVE ACTION IS THE KEY TO 
ENSURING COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL TRADE OBLIGATIONS 
A.  U.S. Courts Have Emphasized Agencies Should Strive for Compliance with 
International Obligations 
Ultimately, the best way to ensure current LNG and crude oil export 
regulations comply with WTO international trade obligations is for the DOE to 
interpret the current statutes in a way that allows for compliance with 
international trade obligations. The legislation underlying the current export 
regulations gave the Executive Branch discretion to interpret whether LNG 
exports are consistent with the “national interest,” although this term is not 
defined in any of the applicable statutes.151  In the leading decision on statutory 
interpretation, Chevron, Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,152 the 
Supreme Court held that when a statute or a term in a statute is ambiguous, courts 
defer to agency interpretation so long as it is “permissible” and “reasonable” and 
is not “arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.”153  As noted 
by Alan M. Dunn, “The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has held that 
when interpreting statutes, a ‘permissible’ and ‘reasonable’ interpretation means 
that wherever a statutory standard—such as ‘public interest’ or ‘national 
interest’ finding—can be interpreted in a manner consistent with GATT, it 
should be.”154 
In addition to giving the agency authority to broadly interpret current export 
regulations, since the early nineteenth century, U.S. courts have consistently 
held that U.S. laws should not be interpreted in a manner that violates 
international obligations.155  The U.S. Court of Appeals has specifically held that 
“an interpretation and application of statutes which would conflict with the 
GATT Codes would clearly violate the intent of Congress.”156  In Caterpillar, 
                                                 
 151. See Natural Gas Act of 1938, ch. 556, 52 Stat. 812 (1938); Energy Policy and 
Conservation Act, Pub. L. No. 94-163, 89 Stat. 871 (1975) (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of the U.S. Code); Export Administration Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-72, 93 Stat. 503 
(codified as amended at 59 U.S.C. §§ 2401–2420). 
 152. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
 153. Id. at 843–44. 
 154. DUNN, supra note 19, at 4–5 (“[T]he Commerce Department’s strong reluctance to make 
a determination that is GATT consistent . . . could be viewed by the U.S. Courts as a failure to 
apply a ‘permissible construction’ or a ‘reasonable interpretation’ to the ambiguous statutory 
provision because Commerce’s decision would be in conflict with the U.S. commitments under 
GATT 1994.”). 
 155. Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804) (“[A]n act of 
Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction 
remains . . .”). 
 156. Fed. Mogul Corp. v. United States, 63 F.3d 1572, 1581 (1995) (“GATT agreements are 
international obligations, and absent express Congressional language to the contrary, statutes 
should not be interpreted to conflict with international obligations.”). 
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Inc. v. United States,157 the Supreme Court held if an agency is interpreting a 
statute in a way that violates the GATT, the agency must prove Congress 
specifically intended the statute to violate the GATT.158 
If the Administration’s national interest determinations were challenged in 
U.S. courts, the Administration would be required to prove that the 
Congressional intent of each of the applicable regulating statutes was to violate 
GATT.159  GATT originated in 1948, but at least one of the four applicable 
export statutes, the Natural Gas Act, originated in 1938.160  Further, the last 
revision of the GATT was in 1986, yet the Energy Policy and Conservation Act 
became law in 1975.161  This statutory timeline could make it difficult for the 
Administration to argue that through these laws Congress intended to permit the 
Administration to violate international trade rules that were not in existence at 
the time the statutes were enacted.162  If challenged in federal court, there is 
significant Supreme Court precedent for a court to find that current agency 
interpretation of these regulations is not “reasonable” or “permissible” because 
it violates the GATT and our obligations under the WTO.163 
As strong as this statutory interpretation argument is, ultimately, to prevail in 
a challenge against the Administration’s interpretation of current regulations, a 
party would have to argue that current agency interpretation is “arbitrary” or 
“capricious.” 164   Courts have historically been very deferential to agency 
                                                 
 157. 941 F. Supp. 1241 (Ct. Int’l. Trade 1996). 
 158. Id. at 1248; see also Union Steel v. United States, 823 F. Supp. 2d 1346, 1358 (Ct. Int’l 
Trade 2012) (finding that the Department of Commerce has broad discretion to ensure its actions 
comply with WTO obligations and it may adjust its compliance efforts as long as they do not violate 
the statute), aff’d, 713 F.3d 1101 (Fed. Cir. 2013). 
 159. Caterpillar, 941 F. Supp. at 1248 (holding that the burden is on the Government to prove 
Congress intended a statute to violate the GATT).  While the court acknowledged the Government’s 
contention that if the GATT conflicts with a statute, then the statute controls, they noted the 
“commitment of the judicial branch to interpret acts of Congress consistently with international 
agreements” and that “statutes should not be interpreted to conflict with international obligations.”  
Id. at 1247. 
 160. See supra notes 23, 59 and accompanying text. 
 161. See supra notes 40, 59 and accompanying text. 
 162. See Comm. of U.S. Citizens Living in Nicar. v. Reagan, 859 F.2d 929, 936 (D.C. Cir. 
1988) (“[O]ur court reaffirmed the principle that treaties and statutes enjoy equal status and 
therefore that inconsistencies between the two must be resolved in favor of the lex posterior.”).  
The question would then become whether lex posterior, the doctrine stating that the “last in time” 
controls, would apply to international agreements like the GATT.  See STEPHEN DYCUS ET AL., 
NATIONAL SECURITY LAW 181 n.6 (5th ed. 2011). 
 163. See Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804) (propounding 
the Charming Betsy principle, which states that an “act of Congress ought never be construed to 
violate the law of nation if any other possible construction remains.”). 
 164. Chevron, Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984) (“[A] court 
may not substitute its own construction of a statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation made 
by the administrator of an agency.”). 
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interpretation, making this a challenging, but not impossible, standard to 
overcome.165 
While amending the current regulatory statutes would certainly solve the 
issue, the current statutes do not need to be rewritten if the DOE simply interprets 
the original language of the statute in a manner that does not violate U.S. trade 
obligations. 166 
B.  The Department of Energy Should Consider Compliance with International 
Trade Obligations as being Consistent with the Public Interest 
Currently, the DOE takes months or years to approve a license for natural gas 
exports to non-FTA countries, while exports to FTA countries receive 
expeditious approval.167  There are two ways to solve this inconsistency that 
would allow DOE to interpret LNG export regulations in a way that does not 
violate WTO rules.  First, the DOE could simply interpret the Natural Gas Act 
of 1938 so that LNG export applications to any country should be approved in 
five days or less, so long as the approval is not inconsistent with the public 
interest.168  Second, the DOE could issue a finding that compliance with our 
existing WTO obligations is “consistent with the public interest,” or to consider 
our obligations as WTO members as one determination for an LNG export 
application.169 
C.  Congress Should Legislatively Lift Prohibitive Export Restrictions on 
Natural Gas Exports 
On December 18, 2015, after years of debate and multiple legislative efforts, 
the United States Congress passed a mandatory annual spending measure that 
                                                 
 165. Id. (“[C]onsiderable weight should be accorded to an executive department’s construction 
of a statutory scheme it is entrusted to administer, and the principle of deference to administrative 
interpretations.”). 
 166. Id. (demonstrating that the courts give deference to an agency’s interpretation of 
Congressional statutes); see Caterpillar, Inc. v. United States, 941 F. Supp. 1241, 1247 (Ct. Int’l 
Trade 1996) (finding that an agency should not interpret statutes in a way that violate international 
agreements). 
 167. Tyler Wilson & Uday Turaga, Summary of the LNG Export Regulatory Process, ADI 
ANALYTICS (Feb. 17, 2015), http://adi-analytics.com/2015/02/17/summary-of-the-lng-export-
regulatory-process/. 
 168. See Report of the Panel, Japan—Trade in Semi-Conductors, ¶ 118, L/6309 (Mar. 24, 
1988), GATT B.I.S.D. (35th Supp.), at 31 (1989) (finding license approvals granted within five 
days may not violate GATT rules). 
 169. Brown, supra note 31 (noting that the DOE considers a wide variety of factors, such as 
economic, international, domestic security and environmental impacts when making public interest 
determinations).  The DOE has also stated its intent to “monitor” factors such as changes in natural 
gas demand and technological advancements to ensure LNG exports do not result in a decrease of 
LNG available to meet domestic needs, as the “cumulative impact of these . . . could pose a threat 
to the public interest.”  Sabine Pass Liquefaction, LLC, DOE/FE Order No. 2961, at 32–33 (May 
20, 2011). 
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quietly lifted the forty- year ban on crude oil exports.170  Through lifting the ban, 
Congress has brought U.S. crude oil export policies not only into the twenty-first 
century, but also into compliance with our international trade obligations as 
members of the WTO.171 
If the Administration does not pursue administrative action to ease or 
eliminate permitting restrictions on LNG exports, Congress can take legislative 
action on its own to lift LNG export restrictions.172  Accordingly, there have 
been legislative efforts to this end but they have failed to gain momentum, 
possibly due to being overshadowed by the crude oil export debate, which has 
taken center stage in recent years.173  One potential obstacle to legislative efforts 
to lift LNG export restrictions may be the current Administration itself, which 
has opposed recent legislative efforts to lift or streamline both crude oil and 
natural gas export restrictions.174  Despite this opposition, the best way to bring 
U.S. export policies into compliance with international trade obligations as a 
WTO member may be for Congress to “amend the Natural Gas Act to formally 
allow exports of natural gas to all WTO member countries, without the need for 
the current project-by-project approval from the DOE.”175 
                                                 
 170. HOUSE & WASSON, supra note 50; see Matt Piotrowski, Update: The Crude Oil Export 
Debate Explained, THE FUSE (Sept. 11, 2015), http://www.energyfuse.org/crude-oil-export-
debate-explained/ (outlining the multiple legislative efforts to overturn the crude oil export ban). 
 171. DUNN, supra note 19, at 1.  Despite previously issuing a veto threat for legislation in the 
House of Representatives that would have lifted the crude export ban, the President signed the 
spending bill into law.  OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, 
STATEMENT OF ADMINISTRATION POLICY: H.R. 702 –TO ADAPT TO CHANGING CRUDE OIL 
MARKET CONDITIONS (Oct. 7, 2015), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/legis 
lative/sap/114/saphr702r_20151007.pdf. 
 172. MICHAEL E. PORTER ET AL., HARV. BUS. SCH., AMERICA’S UNCONVENTIONAL ENERGY 
OPPORTUNITY 45 (2015), http://www.hbs.edu/competitiveness/Documents/america-unconven 
tional-energy-opportunity.pdf. 
 173. Turner, supra note 147; see HOUSE & WASSON, supra note 50. 
 174. PORTER, supra note 172, at 45; see OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE 
PRESIDENT, STATEMENT ON ADMINISTRATION POLICY: H.R. 702 – TO ADAPT TO CHANGING 
CRUDE OIL MARKET CONDITIONS (Oct. 7, 2015), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/ 
files/omb/legislative/sap/114/saphr702r_20151007.pdf (the Obama Administration opposed 
previous Congressional efforts to lift the ban on similar restrictions to crude oil exports); see also 
OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, STATEMENT ON 
ADMINISTRATION POLICY: H.R. 8 – NORTH AMERICAN ENERGY SECURITY AND INFRASTRUCTURE 
ACT OF 2015 (Nov. 30, 2015), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/legislative/ 
sap/114/saphr8r_20151130.pdf.  While the Administration has not explicitly opposed easing 
natural gas permit restrictions or natural gas exports, it opposed similar legislation regarding natural 
gas pipelines, which it believed would have “curtailed DOE’s ability to fully consider whether 
natural gas export projects are consistent with the public interest.”  Id. 
 175. PORTER, supra note 172, at 45; see Danielle Spiegal-Feld, In the LNG Export Debate, the 
WTO Can’t be Ignored, BREAKING ENERGY (June 23, 2014), http://breakingenergy.com/2014/ 
06/23/in-the-lng-export-debate-the-wto-cant-be-ignored/ (concluding that the United States may be 
able to continue to curtail exports in a way that does not violate WTO obligations through careful 
policy formulation). 
2016] Natural Gas Export Regulations and Trade Obligations 831 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
In the midst of growing calls to revise and modernize America’s policies 
regulating the export of LNG for economic reasons, renewed focus has been 
placed on whether or not this decades-old policy complies with our international 
trade obligations.176  Several exceptions in the GATT allow for countries to 
enact restrictive trade policies if the country can successfully argue the policy is 
in place to conserve a natural resource, protect the public, or is essential to the 
country’s national security interests.177  As U.S. policies are not applied in a 
nondiscriminatory fashion and are not enacted simultaneously with domestic 
policies that restrict production or consumption of LNG, it is unlikely the United 
States can successfully argue these policies are valid exercises of conservation 
or protection measures.178  The strongest argument the United States has for its 
current restrictions to qualify that a WTO exemption is assert that the export 
restrictions are essential to America’s national security interests.  But because 
the WTO has never ruled on this exemption, there is no precedent to look to for 
guidance.179 
Contrary to claims that the United States must statutorily revise current LNG 
and crude oil regulations in order to comply with our international trade 
obligations, the solution lies in simply revising the DOE’s interpretation of 
current statutes.180  By adhering to legal precedent and concluding that free trade 
in energy commodities and complying with international trade obligations is in 
our best national interest, the Administration can avoid a WTO challenge and 
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